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Counter-terrorist detention and international human rights 
law 
Fiona de Londras  
  
1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Ordinarily states only detain individuals involuntarily for reasons associated with pre-
trial custody, post-conviction punishment, or the protection of individuals (as in 
relation to health). In these cases detention is primarily punitive or protective and only 
rarely or incidentally preventive. Counter-terrorist detention of the kind that this 
chapter is concerned with — namely, the detention of suspected terrorists as opposed 
to those convicted of terrorism offences — has a radically different character 
inasmuch as its purpose is primarily preventive.
1
  
On a purely utilitarian level, suspected terrorists are detained to both prevent their 
own further engagement in terrorist activity and to acquire information or intelligence 
that might disrupt the involvement of others in terrorism. On a semantic level, 
however, suspected terrorists may be detained to manifest the coercive capacity of the 
threatened state. Particularly where the detention in question takes place in a manner 
that seems to challenge established elements of the rule of law, it may also aim to 
communicate clearly a state’s willingness to do what it considers necessary to protect 
its polity and not ‘merely’ to do what is legally permissible.2  
Thus counter-terrorist detention is of a qualitatively different character to other 
kinds of detention, although that is not to suggest that it is entirely sui generis. 
Certainly there are ways in which the character of counter-terrorist detention can be 
said to align with the detention of anti-establishment protesters, particularly in 
authoritarian or dictatorial states. That said, the important point in the context of this 
chapter is to note from the outset that there is something particular about the nature of 
counter-terrorist detention. 
The particular character of counter-terrorism means that detention is very often 
administrative in nature. Administrative detention can be broadly defined as detention 
that is (i) done under executive authority and without legislative mandate; or (ii) done 
pursuant to a legislative mandate but where the determination of who is to be detained 
is administrative; or (iii) both.  
A recent example of the interaction between executive and legislative powers of 
detention is the United States’ detention of suspected terrorists in Guantánamo Bay, 
Cuba, after 9/11. Prior to the introduction of a clear legislative basis, detention of 
suspected terrorists there was clearly administrative because it was done on executive 
authority and the determination of who was to be detained was administrative in 
                                                 
1 On the extraordinariness of counter-terrorist detention see F de Londras, ‘Prevention, detention and 
extraordinariness’ in F ní Aoláin and O Gross (eds), Guantánamo Bay and Beyond Exceptional Courts 
and Military Commissions In Comparative and Policy Perspective (CUP, 2013). 
2 On semantics and the ‘War on Terror’ see I Ward, Law, Text, Terror (CUP, 2009). 
nature (that is, not determined as a result of a judicial or quasi-judicial process).
3
 Even 
after the introduction of legislative authority in the US’ Detainee Treatment Act of 
2005, however, detention remained administrative because detainees were identified 
by administrative processes. Even after a detainee might have successfully engaged in 
judicial (habeas corpus) or quasi-judicial (Combatant Status Review Tribunal) 
processes, detention could be continued by means of an administrative decision not to 
release. Although the US is by no means the only state to have engaged in 
administrative counter-terrorist detention of this nature, either since September 2001 
or beforehand, it demonstrates well the particularity of counter-terrorist detention, 
albeit in a context also governed by international humanitarian law.  
This chapter outlines the international legal regime governing detention from the 
starting point that what is protected in international law is not a right to be free from 
detention per se but rather a right to be free from the arbitrary deprivation of one’s 
liberty.
4
 This is clearly rooted in international human rights law, which is the main 
focus of this chapter (acknowledging that it interacts with international humanitarian 
law in situations of armed conflict). The chapter proceeds by considering, first, the 
relevance of international human rights law to counter-terrorist detention, and then the 
human rights standards relevant to such detention across four axes: (i) the concept of 
detention; (ii) the acceptability of preventiveness; (iii) the provision of review; and 
(iv) detention in the context of a declared emergency. By means of this analysis, the 
chapter demonstrates that counter-terrorist detention can be compatible with the 
standards of international human rights law as they have been interpreted and applied 
in the past decade, but that in the process of such interpretation and application those 
standards have at times been diluted to a worrying extent. 
 
2.  THE RELEVANCE OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 
 
The decision to focus on international human rights law in this chapter requires some 
preliminary justification. Although contemporary counter-terrorism has an 
increasingly transnational character, a vast amount of counter-terrorist law, policy and 
action continues to be formulated and executed on the domestic level. This does not, 
however, make international law irrelevant to such processes and policies. 
International legal principles have the capacity to shape the parameters of legal 
possibility at the domestic level in the context of counter-terrorism just as they do in 
other contexts. In every field of activity, states are constantly aware of their 
international legal obligations, which in turn have the capacity to outline hard lines of 
legal possibility restricting desired state action. Although states may exceed those 
                                                 
3 President George W Bush, Military Order of November 13, 2001: Detention, Treatment, and Trial of 
Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed Reg 57833 (16 November 2001). 
4 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted 19 December 1966, 999 UNTS 171 
(entered into force 23 March 1976) (‘ICCPR’), art 9; Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms, adopted 4 November 1950, 213 UNTS 221 (entered into force 3 
September 1953) (‘ECHR’), art 5; American Convention on Human Rights, ‘Pact of San José, Costa 
Rica’, adopted 22 November 1969, 1144 UNTS 144 (entered into force 18 July 1978) (‘ACHR’), art 7. 
 
boundaries, they do so cognisant of the fact that their actions may put them in conflict 
with dominant understandings of their international legal obligations.  
This is not to suggest that states do not challenge international law in the counter-
terrorist context. For example, I have previously written of both external and internal 
challenges to international human rights law that have emerged in the contemporary 
counter-terrorist context.
5
 External challenges are ones that deny the relevance or 
applicability of international human rights law to counter-terrorist activity undertaken 
abroad and/or in the context of armed conflict. Internal challenges are ones where the 
relevance of international human rights law is accepted yet states attempt, through 
engagement, to recalibrate human rights standards downwards to permit more 
extensive state action.  
Not even an external challenge, however, prevents the applicability of 
international human rights law as a doctrinal matter. Indeed, in spite of these 
challenges, after 9/11 even states that would have preferred international standards to 
be different (and more permissive of state action) did not turn away from international 
law; rather they continued to engage with it in a way that suggests its resilience in the 
face of counter-terrorist challenges.
6
 
The relevance of international human rights law in this context is further 
illustrated by the fact that NGOs and activists will often use it as the benchmark 
against which to critique counter-terrorist policies in political fora. This is so even 
where human rights law might not be of much domestic legal utility because, for 
example, it has not been incorporated into domestic law in a dualist state. 
International human rights law is thus used as a lever to try to adjust state practice, 
including in relation to counter-terrorist detention.  
Furthermore, international processes such as the Universal Periodic Review and 
state reporting processes to other UN treaty bodies are frequently engaged by civil 
society to identify perceived difficulties with counter-terrorist policies, including 
detention, from a rule of law perspective. In these processes, international legal 
standards are the ones against which state action is measured. In addition, when 
individual detainees challenge their detention they often do so by reference to 
international legal standards, either as part of the case put in domestic courts or in 
making complaints to international institutions such as the European Court of Human 
Rights (ECtHR) or the UN Human Rights Committee. 
It is, then, abundantly clear that international human rights law has a role to play 
in relation to counter-terrorist detention. International human rights law is constantly 
applicable; the fact that a state is experiencing a period of terrorist threat that it 
considers requires, inter alia, counter-terrorist detention does not mean that 
international human rights law loses its relevance. It may apply in a slightly different 
manner (as addressed below, this body of law has structures in place to deal with 
emergency situations) but it always applies. The same is true where a campaign of 
                                                 
5 F de Londras, Detention in the ‘War on Terror’: Can Human Rights Fight Back? (CUP 2011) Ch 3 
(characterising the US as mounting an external challenge and the UK as mounting an internal 
challenge). 
6 Ibid. 
counter-terrorism takes the form of an armed conflict that engages international 
humanitarian law. International human rights law will apply in those circumstances in 
accordance with the principles of lex specialis and is not excluded.
7
 It is, thus, to 
international human rights law that we now turn. 
 
3.  INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW AND COUNTER-
TERRORIST DETENTION 
 
When assessing the international human rights law boundaries of acceptable counter-
terrorist action, one must first recognise that the precise limits imposed by 
international human rights law will depend on whether or not a state has derogated 
from particular human rights standards. As considered in more detail below, where a 
state declares an ‘emergency’ as a result of a terrorist threat, derogating measures 
relating to detention can be introduced. However, even if no emergency is declared 
and there is no derogation, the international human rights system recognises the 
challenge of confronting a terrorist threat and takes a flexible approach. The extent to 
which relevant international human rights standards take surrounding circumstances 
and context into account, even without a state having derogated from the relevant 
standards, is outlined in the forthcoming sections. 
 
A.  The Concept of Detention in International Human Rights Law 
 
In the post-9/11 context two different approaches to depriving suspected terrorists of 
liberty have emerged. The first is ‘traditional’ detention — literally locking people up 
and confining them to a cell, prison or detention centre. In these cases there is no 
doubt that a deprivation of liberty exists and the international standards relating to the 
right to be free from arbitrary detention are engaged.  
The second form of detention, however, is less traditional. It involves the 
imposition of orders — usually through some kind of civil law process — that are 
highly coercive and greatly limit the individual’s freedoms, including freedom of 
movement, freedom to communicate, capacity to earn a living, and so forth. The 
United Kingdom has been a particularly prominent exponent of this approach to 
counter-terrorist quasi-detention, first with ‘control orders’ and now with terrorism 
prevention and investigation measures (TPIMs).
8
  
The quandary for international human rights law with regard to these kinds of 
orders is whether or not they constitute detention per se. If they do, then the relevant 
standard is the right to be free from arbitrary detention, with an associated right to 
challenge the lawfulness of detention; if not, then this standard is not engaged. 
Whether or not any particular order constitutes detention is essentially a matter of 
degree. Indeed, this reflects the view of the ECtHR in Guzzardi v Italy that 
                                                 
7 See, e.g., Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (Advisory Opinion) [1996] ICJ Rep 226. 
8 For a comprehensive overview see C Walker, Terrorism and the Law (OUP 2011).  
deprivation of liberty is essentially a matter of ‘degree or intensity, and not one of 
nature or substance’.9  
Thus, the first point of significance is that what some experience as counter-
terrorist (quasi-) detention may not in fact engage the international human rights 
standards relevant to detention per se.
10
 This is itself a matter of some concern, for 
states are now innovating measures that constitute quasi-detention in a manner that 
allow for substantial restrictions on liberty but which may avoid categorisation as 
detention. They may thus engage other standards that do not, for example, afford a 
person the same right to challenge the lawfulness of the measures as a detainee enjoys 
(considered further below). These measures are clearly designed to have the same 
preventive effects as counter-terrorist detention, and can infringe very significantly on 
quality of life (both for the person under the order and their families and other 
cohabitants), but might not be governed by detention-related human rights standards. 
 
B.  The Acceptability of Preventive Detention 
  
As already noted, counter-terrorist detention is largely preventive in nature and this is 
the source of much rights-based criticism. Yet while international human rights law 
does not contemplate preventive detention as the core type of detention that a state 
might engage in, neither does it definitively prohibit it or regard it as unacceptable. 
Although some may find this controversial, the permissibility of preventive detention 
is clear from reference to the terms of international instruments and their 
interpretation by authoritative bodies.  
Article 9 of the ICCPR has been interpreted to permit preventive detention in 
pursuit of legitimate public purposes such as ‘public security’11 and subject to 
appropriate safeguards being in place.
12
 Article 5(1)(c) of the ECHR allows for 
detention of an individual ‘for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal 
authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence or when it is 
reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing an offence or fleeing after 
having done so’ (emphasis added), which suggests that preventive detention is 
permitted under that regime. In the context of prevention it is clear that the process 
surrounding the detention — and especially the capacity to effectively challenge its 
lawfulness — is key to the acceptability, from a legal perspective, of any particular 
detention regime. The capacity to challenge the lawfulness of detention is considered 
further below. 
                                                 
9 [1980] ECHR 5, [93]. 
10 UK courts have considered whether control orders engage art 5 of the ECHR on a number of 
occasions and found that, in order to determine whether there has been a deprivation of liberty, the full 
range of restrictions imposed on the individual should be taken into account. Thus, for example, in 
Secretary of State for the Home Department v JJ [2007] UKHL 45 the court found that an 18-hour 
curfew combined with a number of other restrictions on communication was in fact more restrictive 
than detention in an open prison and clearly engaged art 5.   
11 UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 8: Article 9 – Right to liberty and security of 
persons, UN Doc HRI\GEN\1\Rev.1 (30 June 1982), [4]. 
12 Ibid. 
 C. The Administrative Nature of Counter-terrorist Detention 
 
Having established that the preventive nature of counter-terrorist detention does not 
render it necessarily incompatible with international human rights law we can now 
turn our attention to its frequently administrative nature. This seems to rub 
uncomfortably against the general requirement that detention be lawful, inasmuch as 
that might be taken to mean that it is done on the basis of a properly ‘promulgated’ 
law.
13
 Where the detention power finds its basis in legislation that law must, of 
course, be promulgated according to the constitutional and other requirements of valid 
law-making in the relevant state. However, a detention power need not have a 
legislative basis to be prima facie non-arbitrary; one must first pay attention to how 
detention powers are organised within the domestic legal system  
Some domestic legal systems permit executive powers of detention (including 
where such executive power arises under a state’s constitution, in which case it may 
be duly ‘promulgated’). Such detention might enjoy a presumption of non-
arbitrariness if it is subject to at least some kind of limitation as well as an effective 
checking mechanism. The ECtHR has found that the provision of an ‘unfettered 
power’ of detention to the Executive is not compatible with non-arbitrariness.14 
Detention powers must not therefore be overly vague or uncertain in scope.  
Further, even where there is an administrative measure of indefinite duration
 
the 
UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention has suggested that the provision of 
safeguards and the deduction of its duration from subsequent time to be served as a 
result of a criminal conviction are factors that can lead to the detention being non-
arbitrary.
15
 Thus, the mere fact of counter-terrorist detention being administrative 
does not in itself make it incompatible with international human rights law. 
 
D. The Capacity to Challenge the Lawfulness of One’s Detention  
 
The key to a true assessment of how well human rights law protects individual liberty 
in the counter-terrorist context is the capacity of a detainee to challenge the 
lawfulness of detention. It is this capacity — and the provision of a rigorous process 
to facilitate it — that provides the core safeguard from arbitrary counter-terrorist 
detention. Thus, most international human rights law instruments require that 
individuals who are subjected to detention are informed of the basis of their detention 
and have the capacity to challenge its lawfulness.
16
 International human rights law 
requires that a judge or court is able to assess compliance with procedural 
                                                 
13 Maestri v Italy (2004) 39 EHRR 38. 
14 Ibid [30]. 
15 Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Civil and Political Rights, including Questions of Torture 
and Detention, UN Doc E/CN.4/1999/63 (18 December 1998). 
16 ICCPR, art 9(2), (4); ECHR, art 5(4); ACHR, art 7(4), (6).  
requirements in domestic law, the reasonableness of the suspicion that forms the basis 
for the detention, and the legitimacy of the purpose of detention.
17
  
The precise requirements for particular review mechanisms vary in terms of 
degree depending on the prevailing circumstances. As held by the ECtHR in Bouamar 
v Belgium, ‘the scope of the obligation … is not identical in all circumstances or for 
every kind of deprivation of liberty’.18 So, although international law requires that a 
detainee have the opportunity to mount a challenge before a ‘court’, this term should 
be taken to mean that the procedure followed must have a judicial character and give 
to the individual concerned guarantees appropriate to the kind of deprivation of liberty 
in question.
19
 The authority hearing the challenge must be capable of ordering the 
release of the detainee
20
 and should be ‘independent, objective and impartial in 
relation to the issues dealt with’.21 
Thus, while international law appears to require that detainees are provided with 
an adversarial procedure
22
 in which they can participate (or be represented by an 
advocate),
23
 the exact format of that procedure will depend on the circumstances of 
the case. Where, as in contemporary counter-terrorist contexts, there are particular 
concerns relating to protecting intelligence information and evidence etc, states enjoy 
some flexibility around process, disclosure and representation of detainees, although 
at the very least the ‘gist’ of the state’s basis for detaining the individual in question 
must be disclosed to him or her.
24
 This flexibility will also be applied to the definition 
of the required ‘speedy’ review of the lawfulness of detention, although the positive 
obligation to arrange the legal system to ensure that petitions are considered promptly 
once they have been lodged remains in force.
25
 
Fundamentally, however, the challenge must have the capacity for effectiveness: it 
must be able to secure the release of the detainee should he or she be successful in the 
claim. As we have seen throughout the past decade of counter-terrorist detention, this 
has been a significant weakness in the review processes put in place to deal with 
detained suspected terrorists. In Guantánamo Bay, the Combatant Status Review 
Tribunals and Administrative Detention Reviews have both determined that some 
                                                 
17 This is deduced from the requirements in ECHR, art 5(4) that detainees ‘shall be entitled to take 
proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and his 
release ordered if the detention is not lawful’ and the almost identical wordings of ICCPR, art 9(4), 
ACHR, art 7(6), Commonwealth of Independent States Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, adopted 26 May 1995 (entered into force 11 August 1998), art 5(3). 
18 (1988) 11 EHRR 1, [60]. 
19 Ibid [57]. 
20 UN Human Rights Committee, Shafiq v Australia, Communication No 1324/2004, UN Doc 
CCPR/C/88/D/1324/2004 (13 November 2006). 
21 UN Human Rights Committee, Saimijon & Bazaro v Uzbekistan, Communication No 959/2000, UN 
Doc CCPR/C/87/959/2000 (8 August 2006) [8.3]; UN Human Rights Committee, Kulomin v Hungary, 
Communication No 321/1992, UN Doc CCPR/C/50/D/521/1992 (22 March 1996) [11.3].  
22 Sanchez-Reisse v Switzerland (1986) 9 EHRR 71. 
23 Toth v Austria (1991) 14 EHRR 551; UN Human Rights Committee, Bousroual v Algeria, 
Communication No 992/2001, UN Doc CCPR/C/86/D/992/2001 (24 April 2006); UN Human Rights 
Committee, de Morais v Angola, Communication No 1128/2002, UN Doc CCPR/C/83/D/2002 (18 
April 2005). 
24 A & Others v United Kingdom (2009) 49 EHRR 29. 
25 See, e.g., E v Norway (1990) 17 EHRR 30. 
detainees do not require continued detention, as has the Task Force established by 
President Obama to review the closure of the base,
26
 yet dozens of such individuals 
remain in detention. This is ostensibly because of the challenges in returning them to 
states where they face a real risk of torture or inhuman treatment (in the case of 
Uighur detainees) or because the security situation is too unstable to address security 
concerns should detainees be returned there (in the case of Yemeni detainees).
27
  
Similarly, in the UK the House of Lords’ decision finding that indefinite detention 
in Belmarsh Prison pursuant to Part 4 of the Anti-Terrorism Crime and Security Act 
2001 (UK) was incompatible with human rights
28
 did not result in liberty for the 
detainees but rather the introduction of control orders,
29
 since replaced by TPIMs.
30
  
In other words, on a systemic level one sort of detention has been replaced with 
another (albeit less extreme) deprivation of liberty. One might justifiably question 
whether that is a meaningful improvement, or simply demonstrates the capacity of a 
desired government policy (to control individuals in a manner that will prevent them 
from engaging in terrorist activity) to be shoehorned into a form that might comply 
with human rights law but leaves individuals subjected to deeply troubling and 
intrusive measures in real terms.
31
 
 
4.  COUNTER-TERRORIST DETENTION IN A DECLARED EMERGENCY 
 
In cases where states design and execute their counter-terrorist detention policy in a 
declared emergency context, the international human rights law regime that applies is 
altered. An emergency that threatens the life of the nation can be declared, leading to 
derogation from the detention provisions of the relevant instrument.
32
 Derogation 
permits a reduced level of rights protection and enhances the state’s capacity to take 
actions oriented at confronting the perceived threat. 
Perhaps surprisingly, there have been relatively few derogations to permit 
counter-terrorist detention in the post-9/11 context. The US has not derogated from its 
international obligations relating to the right to be free from arbitrary detention to 
facilitate its current and extensive counter-terrorist detention programme, no doubt 
reflecting the US’s position that international human rights law does not apply extra-
territorially (but only within a state’s own territory33) and in the context of a global 
                                                 
26 A full account is provided in US Guantánamo Review Task Force, Final Report (22 January 2010). 
27 Ibid. 
28 A & Others v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] 2 AC 68 (‘Belmarsh Case’). 
29 See Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 (UK). 
30 See Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011 (UK). 
31 For more on the inadequacy of human rights law to ensure human rights enjoyment in this context 
see, e.g., L Zedner, ‘Preventive justice or pre-punishment? The case of control orders’ (2007) 60 
Current Legal Problems 174. 
32 ICCPR, art 4; ECHR, art 15; ACHR, art 27. The concept of emergency is one on which there is little 
consensus, but that debate is beyond the scope of this chapter. For the classical account see J 
Fitzpatrick, Human Rights in Crisis: The International System for Protecting Rights During States of 
Emergency (University of Pennsylvania Press, 1994).  
33 On the claim that international human rights law obligations do not apply extra-territorially see, e.g., 
US Department of State, The United States’ Oral Response to the Questions asked by the Committee 
Against Torture (8 May 2006) <http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/68562.htm>. 
armed conflict against terrorist groups (as the US also initially claimed that such 
groups were not covered by international humanitarian law).
34
  
In Europe the UK is the only state to have declared an emergency and derogate in 
direct reaction to the attacks of 11 September 2001, although that derogation no 
longer remains in force.
35
 In the Belmarsh case, in 2004 the UK House of Lords 
accepted that the threat of contemporary transnational terrorism by Al Qaeda was 
sufficiently grave to constitute a ‘public emergency’ threatening the life of the United 
Kingdom, although a number of judges dissented.
36
 Other states have also 
occasionally derogated from their human rights obligations in other contexts than the 
immediate Al-Qaeda-related threat after 9/11.
37
 
Where a state derogates, the right to be free from arbitrary detention can be varied 
but it cannot be entirely suspended; as outlined below protections against arbitrariness 
remain, including the right to challenge the lawfulness of detention. Thus, a state may 
be permitted to hold people suspected of involvement in terrorism for a longer period 
of time prior to charge or trial than normal, or on a lower standard of proof than 
would usually be expected. However, conscious of the vulnerabilities that are 
experienced in detention, international institutions have required that the right to 
challenge the lawfulness of one’s detention remains in force even when a state has 
derogated.
38
 Perhaps the strongest statement of this is the Advisory Opinion on 
Habeas Corpus in Emergency Situations issued by the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights in 1987.
39
 There the Court held that habeas corpus (and amparo
40
) 
cannot be suspended in times of emergency as these judicial protections are essential 
guarantees of the protection of individual rights (including non-derogable rights such 
as the right to be free from torture) and central to the ‘effective exercise of 
                                                 
34 On the claim that these groups were not entitled to rights under international humanitarian law, see 
ibid.  
35 UK Derogation from Article 5 was communicated to the Secretary General of the Council of Europe 
by note verbale on 18 December 2001; see also The Human Rights Act 1998 (Designated Derogation) 
Order 2001. The derogation was lifted in 2005; see The Human Rights Act 1998 (Amendment) Order 
2005. 
36 Belmarsh Case, above n 28.  
37 For a broad analysis of derogations in the case of terrorist violence see O Gross and F Ní Aoláin, 
Law in Times of Crisis: Emergency Powers in Theory and Practice (CUP 2006), Ch 7. 
38 UN Human Rights Committee, Alegre v Peru, Communication No 1126/2002, UN Doc 
CCPR/C/85/D/1126/2002 (17 November 2005); Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Opinion No 
11/2000, UN Doc E/CN.4/2001/14/Add.1 (9 November 2000) 75 (‘Eleuterio Zarate Luján v Peru’). On 
a more general level, see UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment No 29: Article 4 - States of 
Emergency, UN Doc CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11 (31 August 2001); UN Human Rights Committee, 
Concluding Observations of the UN Human Rights Committee: Israel, UN Doc CCPR/C/79/Add.93 
(18 August 1998) [21]; Recommendation by the Committee to the Sub-Commission on Prevention of 
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities concerning a draft third optional protocol to the 
Covenant, UN Doc A/49/40 (vol I), annex XI, [2]. 
39 Advisory Opinion on Habeas Corpus in Emergency Situations (Arts. 27(2), 25(1) and 7(6) American 
Convention on Human Rights (1987) IACtHR (Ser A) No 8, 11 EHRR 33 (‘Advisory Opinion on 
Habeas Corpus’).  
40 Amparo is a constitutional action common in Latin American countries by which an injunction can 
be acquired for the purposes of protecting constitutional rights. 
representative democracy’.41 While an emergency situation may necessitate a 
suspension of certain guarantees, the Court stressed that the rule of law or the 
principle of legality are never suspended; these continue to be the guiding principles 
for governance even in times of strain.
42
 Judicial protections are an essential 
guarantee of the application of and respect for these principles, and habeas corpus is 
the means of guaranteeing protection from what international law recognises as 
among the most egregious human rights violations (as defined by jus cogens and non-
derogable rights),
43
 namely freedom from arbitrary detention. These protections have 
a particular importance in cases of emergency when some rights and freedoms might 
be suspended
44
 and therefore may not be suspended themselves. 
Although the ECtHR has never held that the right to challenge the lawfulness of 
one’s detention is non-derogable, the provision of effective review mechanisms such 
as habeas corpus has been high on the Court’s list of considerations when assessing 
whether counter-terrorist detention measures introduced pursuant to a derogation 
comply with Article 5. Thus, in assessing whether a pre-charge detention period is 
excessive, the Court will take into account the detainee’s access to habeas corpus or 
equivalent proceedings; habeas corpus is seen as an ‘effective safeguard … which 
provided an important protection against arbitrary behaviour and incommunicado 
detention’.45  
International human rights law’s commitment to ensuring that the right to 
challenge the lawfulness of one’s detention must be maintained does not mean that 
international institutions have ensured the effectiveness of review. It has already been 
noted that, absent a derogation, the precise standards that must be fulfilled to 
vindicate this right are variable depending on the circumstances. In the case of 
derogation and counter-terrorist detention, the ‘surrounding circumstance’ of 
(perceived or actual) terrorist violence is a potent one indeed, and can result in human 
rights standards being deemed satisfied by what appears to be quite unsatisfactory 
from an effectiveness perspective. 
In its jurisprudence the ECtHR has tended to assert that the right to challenge the 
lawfulness of detention in Article 5(4) of the ECHR is satisfied by the mere provision 
of habeas corpus in law without considering whether, in a particular case or 
circumstance, the available proceedings provide substantive review before a neutral 
arbiter as required by international law. Thus, in Ireland v United Kingdom the Court 
considered the adequacy of habeas corpus in relation to internment in Northern 
Ireland.
46
 Internment was subject to review by an advisory committee which did not 
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have the power to order release, but internees could enter habeas corpus petitions to 
the High Court of Justice in Northern Ireland challenging the detention only on the 
basis of mala fides on the part of the police officer whose recommendation resulted in 
the internment. Internees could not challenge the lawfulness of detention on the basis 
that the officer’s suspicion was not reasonable. In spite of what appears to be the clear 
inadequacy of this review, the Court found that there had been no violation of Article 
5(4) because habeas corpus petitions were available to an extent and in a manner 
considered appropriate to a situation of ‘emergency’ as defined by the derogation 
clause in Article 15 of the ECHR. The mechanisms for the review of the lawfulness of 
detention available in Northern Ireland would not have been considered appropriate in 
a time of normalcy, but were sufficient in this abnormal time. This was in spite of the 
fact that deprivation of liberty was widespread and susceptible to ‘false positives’ 
precisely because of this conflict-ridden state of affairs. From a rights-oriented 
perspective one would have expected at the least the same level of rigour in such 
reviews, even if the processes of review might have been somewhat altered.  
A similar decision was reached in Brogan v United Kingdom where the ECtHR 
held that detention for just over four days violated Article 5 of the ECHR, but it did 
not find a violation of Article 5(4) as a result of the formal availability of habeas 
corpus to detainees.
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 This was notwithstanding the fact that detainees under the 
Prevention of Terrorism Act 1984 (UK) could be held virtually incommunicado for 
the first 48 hours,
48
 had only limited access to counsel after that time,
49
 and, even 
where a habeas corpus petition was mounted, precedent suggested that the potential 
for success was minimal.
50
 Although Fox, Campbell & Hartley v United Kingdom 
was a welcome break from this trend (holding that where detention was based on 
suspicion, this required a capacity to challenge the reasonableness of that suspicion),
51
 
the Northern Ireland cases evidence an overwhelming acceptance by the Court that 
fairly shallow opportunities to challenge the lawfulness of detention were sufficient 
under the ECHR. 
In the more recent cases on counter-terrorist detention the ECtHR has not injected 
much more rigour into its previous jurisprudence. Although in A v United Kingdom 
the Court held that the detention of non-UK citizens on the basis of Part 4 of the Anti-
terrorism Crime and Security Act 2001 (UK) was not compatible with the ECHR, as it 
discriminated without justification between these individuals and UK citizens, it 
indicated that highly irregular review mechanisms could satisfy the Convention.
52
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A particular challenge in the context of counter-terrorism is how much 
information about the case against a suspected terrorist can be revealed to him or her 
(to allow the detainee to mount an effective challenge) without endangering national 
security (by compromising intelligence sources or methods). The UK’s solution has 
been to appoint ‘Special Advocates’ where it is determined that material should 
remain closed. Special Advocates do not have traditional lawyer-client relationships 
with detainees, but rather are appointed from a security-cleared panel and cannot 
reveal the detail of the case to the detainee.
53
 This clearly poses significant barriers to 
the development of an effective challenge against the decision to detain the 
individual.  
In recognition of this, the ECtHR in A v United Kingdom held that in closed 
material procedures involving Special Advocates the detainee must still be ‘provided 
with sufficient information about the allegations against him to enable him to give 
effective instructions to the special advocate’.54 This is now known as the ‘gisting’ 
requirement; the suspect must be told the ‘gist’ of the case against him and the 
provision of general assertions will not be sufficient. ‘Gisting’ does not however 
require that any significant level of detail be disclosed to the suspected terrorist, and it 
is not at all clear that this is sufficient to enable an effective and meaningful challenge 
to the lawfulness of detention, particularly because the Special Advocate cannot 
communicate with the detainee about the closed material that the advocate is able to 
see. Notwithstanding this, however, ‘gisting’ now seems to satisfy Article 5(4), 
demonstrating what appears to be a continuing commitment to legalism in place of 
effective rights protection.
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5.  SOME REFLECTIONS ON COUNTER-TERRORIST DETENTION AND 
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 
 
In the context of counter-terrorist detention, as in many other contexts, international 
human rights law has to walk a tight line between protecting rights on the one hand 
and keeping states on board on the other. Indeed, both the flexibility afforded to states 
in contexts of terrorist violence and the derogations system itself are reflections of 
international human rights law’s commitment to what Gross and Ní Aoláin call 
‘accommodation’ in crisis situations.56 That said, there is a danger of effective 
protection of rights becoming sacrificed to accommodation. It is difficult to escape the 
feeling that this has happened if one takes into account the extent to which elements 
of counter-terrorist detention have been interpreted as compatible with international 
human rights law. 
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Even without derogation states now administratively detain suspected terrorists — 
or place them in quasi-detention — for periods of time that seemed unimaginable 
when the ECtHR declared that four days of such detention was a violation of the 
ECHR in Brogan v United Kingdom.
57
 With or without derogation, people are 
subjected to many years of detention (often offshore).
58
 The review mechanisms 
available to them are deeply problematic either because of the difficulties detainees 
face in mounting a challenge (including due to the use of closed material) or because 
even a successful challenge cannot necessarily secure one’s liberty. The former 
situation appears to be facilitated by human rights law, which is in danger of 
undermining the high premium it places on the availability of review by accepting 
highly irregular processes and inadequate legal representation as compatible with 
human rights law. The latter is in clear contravention of a proper understanding of 
human rights law. But the fact of such contravention is not sufficient to secure a 
liberty-enhancing change where states simply refuse to accept the applicability of 
international human rights law to the relevant circumstances, as is the case with the 
US.  
State practice, as well as claims made to international institutions and human 
rights courts, show that states continue to push the boundaries of what is permissible. 
Where an internal challenge is mounted — which I defined above as an attempt to 
remain within international human rights law but to achieve a downward calibration 
of standards — that ‘pushing’ seems to be effective at expanding the boundaries, 
bringing more and more state action within human rights compatibility regardless of 
the pernicious effects it has on the enjoyment of liberty. Thus, while human rights law 
might be demonstrating its resilience by remaining relevant to contemporary counter-
terrorist detention and asserting some control (especially over challenges to the 
lawfulness of detention), one is left wondering whether that resilience comes at the 
heavy cost of effectiveness in securing the enjoyment of rights. 
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